US LEADERSHIP, MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER PORT IRAQ

Wednesday 29th October 2003

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen:

May I begin by thanking John Blundell for inviting me to participate in this panel discussion on the transatlantic alliance. Having followed Sir Keith Joseph, a great supporter of the IEA, in representing Leeds North East and having been sustained by IEA ideas as a Conservative MP under Margaret Thatcher, I am particularly pleased to be here tonight.

I come to this evening’s discussion wearing two hats. First, as a Conservative MEP who has worked with politicians from across the European Union, I would like to offer some thoughts on the state of the transatlantic alliance. Second, as a member of the recent European Convention, I would like to comment of how the European Constitution will affect the transatlantic alliance, should it be confirmed as proposed.

The transatlantic alliance has been a central feature of US and European foreign policy since the creation of NATO in April 1949. The great question that leader writers and commentators are now asking is whether the recent clash between the United States and Europe (or to be more precise, between the United States and ‘Old Europe’) heralds the end of the transatlantic alliance.

The clichÈd answer to this from Guardian writers and Labour backbenchers is that the alliance is hopelessly shattered by the so-called rightward lurch in American foreign policy and the neo-conservative philosophy of the Bush administration.

I reject this view. Although the transatlantic alliance is not as strong as it was in the Cold War era, there has been greater continuity in the approaches of the Clinton and Bush administrations towards the alliance and multilateralism than discontinuity.

This continuity in approach to Europe from Clinton to Bush is particularly evident in the case of the Balkans. Had Gore won the presidency, he, like Clinton, would have continued the US policy of encouraging greater European peacekeeping and reconstruction, precisely in the way that has been continued, largely undisturbed, under Bush.

Likewise, there has been a good deal of consistency between the two administrations in their attitude towards international institutions and multilateral action. Although it is evident that the Bush administration created waves by declaring itself opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty shortly after entering office, and being openly willing to pursue a unilateralist foreign policy, the Clinton administration in fact practised multilateralism a great deal less than it preached it.

For example, the Clinton administration did not sign the 1996 treaty on anti-personnel landmines, they hedged on US accession to the International Criminal Court and, according to people such as former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, they even worked behind the scenes to undermine the UN’s authority.

Conversely, the Bush administration has not rejected multilateral arrangements outright. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Secretary General Colin Powell built a coalition under the aegis of NATO and ushered in strong transatlantic cooperation, manifesting itself most visibly in Afghanistan.

I am not arguing, Mr Chairman, that the transatlantic alliance has actually improved or that multilateral cooperation has increased under President Bush, but I do believe that there has been a great deal more continuity in US foreign policy than those Guardian leaders would suggest.

Mr Chairman, one area which has not been given the attention it deserves is the how the European Constitution might affect multilateral cooperation and the transatlantic alliance. I predict that next year this issue will be as important to the future of these issues as the events following 9/11 have been.

This topic is too big to consider in depth in my remaining five minutes—perhaps some of you would like to explore it in the discussion afterwards—but there are two topics which I would like to touch on: first, foreign and defence policy; and second, trade policy.

The possible effects of the European Constitution—in its present form and should it be ratified—on European Union foreign and defence policies has been well documented. A permanent Foreign Minister, elected in the Council by majority vote, would oversee the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Minister would be ‘double-hatted’, that is to say he would be a Vice President of the Commission as well as chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of Ministers.

The actual content of policy would be decided by majority vote ‘when adopting a decision on the initiative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs further to a request from the European Council.’ Money for the foreign and security policy would come from the Union’s budget, decided by majority voting. Member States would be required to make military and civilian capabilities available to support the common security and defence policy. And, most tellingly, the Constitution stipulates that:

Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.

So much for being merely a ‘tidying up’ exercise, Mr Blair!

There is no denying that if this aspect of the Constitution is not altered by the current intergovernmental conference and if the Constitution is ratified by each Member State, it will have a profound effect on foreign and defence policy and, by extension, multilateral cooperation and the transatlantic alliance.

Well, would it work? It was extremely telling that although the working group discussing foreign and security policy in the Convention reported on time, the publication of the draft articles for consideration by the whole Convention was severely delayed. Why? Because of the lack of European Union agreement over the Iraq crisis.

The lesson we should take from this is that whilst multilateral action is necessary in foreign and security policy, a harmonised approach cannot and should not be the answer. Firstly, because it forces a unified approach where there is often disunity. Secondly, because it excludes countries which lie outside the European Union.

The reason why NATO has been so successful in its 50-year history is twofold: First of all, it takes a much more flexible approach to multilateral cooperation by allowing countries to opt-in to action when it suits their own interests. Second, it includes countries from across the world and—most importantly—it underpins the transatlantic alliance.

And then, Mr Chairman, there is trade policy and the relevance of the European Constitution to it.

It is now widely acknowledged that poor nations are a breeding ground for despots and dictators. From the rise of Hitler in interwar Germany hit by the Great Depression to the enforced poverty in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq used as a means of oppression; poverty and good governance do not go hand-in-hand.

Extremes of poverty and disease produce the failed states of tomorrow and failed states breed terrorism and the drugs trade. Part of the ‘war against terror’ must be help for the third world. And the most effective way to help the third world, as the late Peter Bauer taught us in his pamphlets for the IEA, is trade. To quote an old maxim: ‘countries that trade together, stay together.’

I am not the best qualified person here to talk about trade policy—I know that Dr Razeen Sally is an expert in this area as well as a great exponent of free trade—but I would like to touch on trade policy in relation to the European Constitution.

One of the many amendments I tabled to the draft Constitution in the Convention was to make free trade a key objective of the European Union. The Constitutional text refers to developing a ‘highly competitive’ economy and promoting ‘solidarity and mutual respect among peoples’, but nowhere does it unambiguously mention free trade.

Many people in the UK and, I suspect, elsewhere, subscribe to the EU because they believe it should be primarily or even exclusively concerned with free trade. The protectionist barriers to trade put up by the European Union are a disgrace. A disgrace for people in the Third World who live in poverty as a result of economic sclerosis. And a disgrace for people living in the First World who live in fear of the terrorists harboured by the regimes which maintain their grip through enforced poverty.

But protectionism is not just confined to the European Union. The EU could not have a better ally than George W. Bush, but his administration has introduced swinging tariffs to protect West Virginian steel-makers and gives subsidies to Texan cotton farmers—at our expense.

I believe that the European Union and the United States should extend multilateral cooperation in trade policy and promote free trade. The first step would be to introduce free trade between the EU and the North American Free Trade Area. This is widely supported, but blocked by the French. The second stage is to move actively to promote trade with the Third World.

In conclusion, Mr Chairman, the transatlantic alliance has not been shattered by Iraq and there are still many areas such as trade policy where we can and should work together. What the European Union must not do is to interpret multilateral cooperation in Eurocentric and Eurofederalist terms. Multilateral cooperation in areas such as defence should always be on an international and flexible basis.

Thank you.